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The war of writing: French 





This article examines perceptions of the Algerian war among French intellectuals and in 
mainstream French culture. Against the background of France’s social and political situation 
in the 1950s − declining international prominence, the loss of its colonies, rapid industrial 
modernization, and increasing moves toward individualism − the essay discusses the reactions of 
left-leaning writers and critics to the war and the way it was represented in popular culture after 
the escalating violence prompted more sharply defined political positions. Focusing on the issue of 
two types of engagements − political and literary − the author suggests that the redefined notion 
of commitment, as formulated by Albert Camus and Maurice Blanchot in response to Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s emphasis on unconditional action, offered a conception of political, social and cultural 
transformation designed to undo the violence inherent in Sartre’s promotion of self-assured 
values and insular ideas.
Keywords
Algerian war, Maurice Blanchot, Albert Camus, committed literature, decolonization, Jean-Paul 
Sartre
A major challenge of literary language is that it is stubbornly indeterminate. Both a vice 
and a virtue, the indeterminateness of literary language has acquired the status of an 
impasse − one which Jean-Paul Sartre and Stéphane Mallarmé faced perhaps most 
directly and resolutely. The question of whether the indeterminateness of literary lan-
guage is a vice or a virtue, however, has rarely been treated without some degree of 
ambiguity. Not even for Sartre and Mallarmé was the issue so neatly polarized. Although 
for Sartre indeterminateness was clearly a vice, for Mallarmé it was not necessarily a 
virtue. Mallarmé too saw it as a vice, but one which he, unlike Sartre, did not want to, or 
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did not think it could be, overcome. Whereas Sartre wanted to correct the propensity of 
literature to defer and diffuse meaning, and make literary language and what it talks 
about coincide by finding a transparent language in which words − in a twist on 
J. L. Austin − would do things, Mallarmé chose to follow the imprudence of literary lan-
guage and, because it could be neither ignored nor directly contested, accepted the stakes 
and decided to defeat literary language at its own game. What these two projects, in their 
ever intensifying versions − the increasing frenzy of Sartre’s writing that could not hide 
the anxiety that if it came to a standstill it would expose the unsteadiness of its language, 
and Mallarmé’s growing obsession with silence and the vision of the blank page − reveal 
is that both the effort to stabilize meaning and the attempt to dispose of it prove equally 
futile. The more one tries to make literary language convey the intended meaning, the 
more it slips away; and the more one tries to eradicate it, the more obvious it becomes 
that referentiality will not disappear. Since meaning can be neither fixed nor destroyed, 
literary language is forever suspended between the referential and the figural.
Much changed for Sartre and those who challenged his take on the indeterminateness 
of literary language in the decade following his What is Literature? (1948), with its 
appeal to committed writing and a renunciation of the Mallarméan approach as disen-
gaged. The most crucial event, and one that for many redefined their understanding of 
literature and the role of the writer, was the war in Algeria that took place between 1 
November 1954 and 18 March 1962. The Algerian war, that ‘battle of writing’, as Michel 
Crouzet dubbed it (Crouzet, 1963: 51), or, as Jean-François Sirinelli called it, a ‘war of 
petitions’ (Sirinelli, 1991), was both a decisive and a divisive event for the self-definition 
of many French intellectuals. With the dream of French universalism finally disintegrat-
ing, the ensuing discussions about freedom, violence and national identity produced both 
surprising alliances (between the left and conservative Christians, for example) and rifts 
and separations (the famous discord between Sartre and Albert Camus, or the making of 
Raymond Aron into a major polemicist on the more conservative side of the political 
spectrum). Political allegiances were rearranged again in 1956 after Nikita Khrushchev’s 
revelation of the crimes of Stalinism at a Communist Party congress and the Soviet inva-
sion of Hungary later that year, undergoing further shifts (Sartre’s move towards 
Tiersmondism) and detachments (Maurice Merleau-Ponty distancing himself from the 
far left, and especially from Sartre).
With the exceptions of Camus and later Pierre Bourdieu, however, most French intel-
lectuals actually knew little about the situation in Algeria. Nor did they perceive it to be 
a problem. Personal experience and first-hand knowledge were often thought to act as a 
restraint, preventing them, as the main line of Sartre’s reproaches against Camus went, 
from seeing the larger picture and endorsing historically necessary changes. Even the 
preference for political factions in Algeria and Algeria’s future directions were some-
times driven by this greater historical vision, as for instance in the support for the 
National Liberation Front (FLN), with its younger progressive activists, over the Algerian 
National Movement (MNA), with its older, more conservative, and less revolutionary-
leaning members. It was this presumptuous attitude that made Tony Judt label the post-war 
decade in France an ‘age of irresponsibility’ (Judt, 1998: 14) during which everyone − 
except Camus and Aron, according to Judt − accepted the fact that they had to pick sides: 
left or right, East or West, pro- or anti-colonialism.1 Notwithstanding their perspective and 
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depth of insight, however, for most French intellectuals − perhaps with the exception of 
those affiliated with the French Communist Party (PCF), as Danièle Joly insists, who 
kept a dual and disingenuous stance (illustrated by the PCF abstaining from a vote on 
‘special powers’) of being in favour of the ‘French presence’ in Algeria but not support-
ing military intervention: being in favour of ‘French Union’, as the party put it, in which 
Algeria would not have independence but ‘liberty’ (Joly, 1991: 69) − the Algerian war 
was a site of genuine political interests and engagements, serving as a vehicle for intel-
lectuals’ self-conceptions and redefinitions, regardless of whether they argued for uncon-
ditional independence or only social, cultural and political transformation.
While intellectuals defending various positions either against state policy or in its 
support engaged in intense debates, popular writers within mainstream French culture 
appealed to the power of literature to lend itself to the status quo and externalize preva-
lent values. Literature has always shown a remarkable ability to subvert the status quo. 
But it has perhaps even more often done the opposite, namely reflected taken-for-granted 
beliefs and presented unquestioned values as natural. One of the central topoi − or, rather, 
myths − of the second case, by which writers of more conservative stripes appealed to 
these spontaneous values during the Algerian war, was the figure of the paratrooper. Best 
exemplified by Jean Lartéguy’s bestselling novel, The Centurions (1960), about a group 
of paratroopers who, though alienated from French society after leaving Indochina, 
prove themselves and their devotion to France in Algeria, the figure of the paratrooper 
symbolized steadfastness to national values and functioned as a catalyst of the view that 
the Algerian conflict was a defence of Western civilization. Although paras, as they 
came to be called, often went directly to Algeria from France’s humiliating 1954 defeat 
at Dien Bien Phu, they retained their heroic reputation and, as John Talbott showed, held 
an important place in French imagination as symbols of adventure, physical strength and 
high moral principles despite attempts to debunk this vision as a quasi-fascist delusion 
(Talbott 1976: 69−70). Although the central place of paratroopers in popular French 
imagination during the Algerian war was a blatant distortion of facts − Philip Dine under-
lines how paratroopers ‘dominated the news coverage of the conflict, in spite of the fact 
that they made up less than 5 per cent of the total French forces in Algeria’ (Dine, 1994: 
26) − this misrepresentation was in line with the deeply embedded evocation of the 
Maghreb as a place where the French naturally belonged: a Latin place, a Mediterranean 
culture of undeniably Roman origins.
Much of the response to the Algerian war in mainstream French literature and media 
was an expression of frustration at France’s loss of stature and identity. As suppressed 
memories of the Vichy regime, the defeat in Vietnam, the loss of Tunisia and Morocco, 
and the increasingly precarious situation in Algeria undermined France’s sense of 
national prominence, its blatant exclusion from international politics exacerbated this 
feeling of disappointment. France’s status as a non-nuclear power, the way it was kept 
out of the intelligence exchange loop between the US and the UK, and how it was side-
lined from any political decisions on Germany were, among other humiliations, as these 
blows were perceived in France − and which, as Irwin Wall details, France countered 
with calculated anti-American foreign policies (Wall, 2008: 121; Wall, 2001: 165−74) 
− both a symptom and a consequence of the loss of grandeur. The very critical stance of 
the United States on the French involvement in Algeria, driven, as Matthew Connelly has 
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argued, by the concern that Algeria might become a Cold War battleground (Connelly, 
2001: 221), only fuelled French complexes. After the 1956 Suez crisis − with France 
feeling betrayed when Britain, under US pressure, rapidly withdrew from a joint French, 
British and Israeli attack on Egypt, an operation that France joined with the goal of sup-
pressing the potential spread of pan-Islamism espoused by Egyptian president Gamal 
Abdel Nasser into its holdings in Northern Africa − France decided to reassert its impor-
tance and independence. France would now induce a massive modernization of its indus-
try, work towards developing an atomic capability, and, most importantly, hold onto 
Algeria, as it was seen as a question of national identity and prestige.2
It was this old-fashioned sense of national identity and prestige that, together with 
their articulation and reiteration in mainstream culture, was put into question by left-
leaning intellectuals. What united otherwise diverse leftists against the predominant 
national sentiment was their opposition to cultural short-sightedness, axiomatic truths 
and national myths. While for Christian critics such as François Mauriac the problem 
was not so much the tradition itself but its implementation − not too much tradition, but 
too little of it − for people like Albert Camus, Maurice Blanchot, Dionys Mascolo, 
Marguerite Duras and Roland Barthes the problem was more profound. Although these 
writers and critics lacked a unified political position − Camus was a moderate leftist 
whose views on Algeria were seen increasingly as conservative; for Blanchot the 
Algerian war continued his slow departure from a dubious pre-war far-right agenda to his 
late 1960s leftist radicalism; Mascolo and Duras were self-proclaimed communists oper-
ating outside the PCF; and Barthes was a progressively more politically engaged literary 
and cultural critic − what they had in common was a critique of their culture and its 
unquestioned values, and what differentiated them from more radical activists such as 
Sartre, Francis Jeanson, and Frantz Fanon was their rejection of the latter figures’ uncon-
ditional endorsement of action. Camus and Blanchot, in particular, offered an important 
revision of the understanding of politics and literature, a revision directed against both 
national frustrations and the way they were culturally enacted, and the radical views of 
those such as Sartre. Refusing to use literature as a tool of agitation, whether for oppos-
ing the status quo or reinforcing it, Camus and Blanchot regarded Sartre’s notion of 
engagement and action not as a solution, but as part of the problem from which their era 
suffered. Their main concern was that Sartre’s rhetoric of action in fact replicated what it 
wished to overcome. More than just direct political action was needed, and literature, 
they insisted, was vital to the enterprise.
The dominant view of literary engagement in France at the beginning of the Algerian 
war was still that of Sartre’s What is Literature? Defining literature as an active ‘quest 
for truth that utilizes language’ (Sartre, 1949 [1948]: 12, italics in original), Sartre 
stressed the obligation of prose literature to represent reality and communicate with a 
concern for clarity. Literature must be utilitarian, he argued, because writers work with 
words that refer beyond themselves, words that are a ‘particular moment of action that 
[have] no meaning outside of’ themselves (Sartre, 1949: 21) and that, with their power to 
uproot from the given, must be effective in stimulating readers’ active responses. What 
this meant in the mid 1950s was that writers and critics who wanted to be politically 
committed needed to articulate an unambiguous opposition to mainstream culture. 
During the Algerian war this culture was at the peak of what Henry Rousso described as 
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‘refoulement’ (Rousso, 1990: 109): the time of repressed memory through which the 
Fifth Republic tried to suppress all past divisions (i.e. the Vichy regime) for the sake of 
a new beginning and in the name of modernization.3 France’s rapid socio-economic 
transformation and soaring prosperity − which, as Tony Judt has remarked, were surpris-
ingly unaccounted for and often completely ignored by the intellectual left (Judt, 1992: 
288) − were accompanied by a discourse of ahistoricity, brilliantly described by Kristin 
Ross (1995: 12), that enacted state-induced modernization, facilitated erasures of both 
the past (Vichy) and the present (Algeria), and promoted a de-historicized and form-
driven art. An unequivocal opposition to this mainstream cultural trend was seen as para-
mount to any engaged response. Even Roland Barthes, an advocate of the neutral style of 
‘writing degree zero’ just a few years earlier (Barthes, 1953), in 1955 decided to moder-
ate his fondness for descriptively ascetic narratives in favour of concreteness and detail, 
coming to criticize − after a curious eight-year delay and thus clearly as an outcome of 
the Algerian war − the allegorical nature of Albert Camus’s novel The Plague as inade-
quate for identifying historical evil (Barthes, 1993b [1955]), and later (Barthes, 1993c 
[1962]) even curbing his enthusiasm for Alain Robbe-Grillet’s novels whose lack of 
content he had previously extolled (Barthes, 1993a [1954]).
During the course of the Algerian war Sartre further radicalized his view of engage-
ment. In response to the expanding French military deployment in Algeria, and inspired 
by Francis Jeanson’s dedication to direct action, Sartre concluded that literature is never 
engaged enough because even at its most committed it averts people’s attention from real 
events. Calling for a turn from literature to politics in order to bring about a more effec-
tive critique of the French campaign in Algeria, Sartre, as Simone de Beauvoir attests, 
wanted to abandon literature altogether (Beauvoir, 1992 [1963]: 183), and even though 
he was ultimately unable to do so, he was adamant in promoting concrete political action 
in relation to which literature was relegated to an ever more inferior position − a mere 
diversion of attention. Literature was no longer a catalyst to action: it was an obstacle. In 
Words (1964) Sartre finally, even if nostalgically, admitted that during the Algerian war 
he had lost all his confidence in the writer’s redemptive mission:
I have renounced my vocation, but I have not unfrocked myself. I still write. What else can I 
do? Nulla dies sine linea [No day without writing a line]. It is my habit and it is also my 
profession. For a long while I treated my pen as a sword: now I realize how helpless we are. 
(Sartre, 1967 [1964]: 157)
The war opened Sartre’s eyes to the way that literature is deactivating because it turns 
events into images that by the same stroke become a mere source of aesthetic pleasure. 
According to Sartre’s amended scenario of engagement in the late 1950s, one becomes 
part of history not by writing fiction, but only by taking part in political action.4
Two important texts that Sartre wrote at the height of the Algerian war − Search for a 
Method (1968 [1957]) and the preface to Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth (1963 
[1961]) − put an unprecedented emphasis on action (in literary terms, a similar emphasis 
can be found in his 1959 play The Condemned of Altona). The programmatic Search for 
a Method is permeated with the rhetoric of projects, actions and counteractions as attrib-
utes of an engaged praxis, and directed against idleness and lack of resolve. ‘Man defines 
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himself by his project’, Sartre writes, and ‘this material being perpetually goes beyond 
the condition which is made for him, and reveals and determines his situation by tran-
scending it in order to objectify himself − by work, action, and gesture’ (Sartre, 1968 
[1957]: 150). It is project and action that make humankind historical, and the current 
historical task for humanity, as Sartre sees it, is ‘to bring closer the moment when History 
will have only one meaning’ (1968 [1957]: 90, italics in original). Sartre supports this 
call to organized action in the preface to Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth with another 
invocation of history, which this texts presents as a process with the inevitable goal of 
emancipation that one has to accept and act accordingly − embracing, if necessary, even 
violence (1963 [1961]: 21). At this time, Sartre is already convinced that this ideal of 
historical action justifies small injustices in the present in the name of an all-embracing 
justice in the future.
It was precisely the idea of History as Necessity that dominated Sartre’s and other 
radical intellectuals’ views of historical progress that Raymond Aron denounced as the 
opium of French intellectuals (Aron, 2009 [1955]: 161−90).5 Aron was not alone in this 
critique in the mid 1950s, and others, such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Claude Lefort, 
drew attention to Sartre’s peculiar mix of necessity and voluntarism: to his reduction, as 
Howard Davis puts it, of all human relations to a conflict between consciousnesses, and 
of all historical activity to a voluntarism that bows to inevitable historical progress 
(Davis, 1987: 47). What is intriguing about these polemics is that after the escalation of 
violence in the 1957 Battle of Algiers, a majority of the urban French public turned 
against the war and favoured negotiations with the FLN, suggesting that by that year the 
nation was already opposed to violence and open to the idea of Algerian independence, 
a view supported by John Talbott, who shows that as of the following year 56 per cent of 
the population supported withdrawal from the war, with the figure rising to 78 per cent 
in April 1961 at the onset of negotiations with the FLN (Talbott, 1975: 358). Even though 
Sartre’s resoluteness and devotion to militancy after 1957 − arguably shaped, at least in 
part, by his guilt over not getting engaged enough when the opportunity presented itself 
in the past (the Spanish Civil War, the Resistance) and by his fear of not missing the train 
of history again − were instrumental in shifting public opinion even more against the 
war, Sartre’s explanations and theoretical justifications were often questionable, perhaps 
even contributing, as James D. Le Sueur has claimed, to Algeria’s ‘epistemological 
recolonization’ (Le Sueur, 2005: 284) by managing to influence Algeria’s leaders with 
Manichaean categories of identity and ideas about the African race that, as Pierre 
Bourdieu affirms, were ‘irresponsible’ because they did not fit Algeria’s demographics, 
dispersed agrarian character and Islamic history (Bourdieu, 1994: 282).
For Sartre, the epitome of passivity and disengagement during the Algerian war was 
Albert Camus (see Cohen-Solal, 1998). Though at the start of the war Camus’s political 
position was little different from that of other leftist intellectuals − such as Dionys 
Mascolo, Robert Antelme, Marguerite Duras, Michel Leiris and even Sartre, who from 
late 1955 until late 1956 were all involved in the Action Committee of Intellectuals 
Against the Pursuit of the War in Algeria, a group which opposed violence and discrimi-
nation, and did not yet favour separation − his loyalty to the same ideas in the later stages 
of the war was becoming increasingly conservative. In 1958 Camus was still defending 
what he called the Algeria of ‘communities with different personalities’ (Camus, 1995a 
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[1958]: 149), and argued for the right of all those who were already in Algeria − meaning 
the Arabs, Berbers, Italians, Turks, Greeks, Jews and French (1995a [1958]: 145) − to 
remain there.
Camus’s stance on Sartre’s political convictions had been widely known among 
French intellectuals since the August 1952 public break between the two in the pages of 
Les Temps modernes. Although not entirely different from Blanchot, Camus was more 
direct in charging that Sartre was a blind activist, with a politics of action detached from 
reality, and instead driven by an abstract notion of history. According to Camus, the 
privileged place that Sartre gave to action in his political philosophy implied judgements 
of acts, including literary undertakings, by their service to historical progress, the out-
come of which Sartre was confident of knowing. Camus criticized the self-righteousness 
of Sartre’s rhetoric and the force of his theoretical justification as an existential attitude 
that was both ethically and politically contentious as it entailed violence: in the realm of 
ethics, Camus saw Sartre’s approach as problematic because it justified misjudgements 
(in cases when one was wrong for the right reasons, one was right to be wrong); and in 
the realm of politics, as Camus restated in the 1958 preface to Algerian Reports, the 
emphasis on action nourished the dialectic of resentment in which the oppressed turned 
into victimizers of their former oppressors (Camus, 1995b [1958]: 114−16).
Although the dispute between Camus and Sartre regarding engagement and action 
took the form of a political argument over history, justice and rebellion, literature became 
ever more essential as a platform in Camus’s continuing disagreement with Sartre. 
Camus remained involved politically throughout the Algerian war, making low-profile 
interventions (mostly in defence of individual Algerian rebels) even after his formal 
retreat from public involvement in the matters of Algeria in the aftermath of the December 
1957 Stockholm colloquium where, asked pointedly by a young Algerian why he did not 
speak out against injustices in Algeria as he did against those in Eastern Europe, Camus 
agreed that justice was important, but ending terror was even more so − a position that 
gained notoriety after his impromptu statement that he would defend his mother before 
defending justice.6 Camus’s controversial decision to withdraw from all political discus-
sions was, he insisted, inevitable, so as not to fuel the conflict’s violence by taking sides. 
After this withdrawal, and as a counterpart to his ongoing private political interventions, 
literature took on a vital role for Camus as a mode of engagement. Literature became 
central to his critique of the political paradigm propounded by Sartre, which measured 
engagement by the amount of action through which it was expressed and which it 
generated.
Camus formulated his idea of engagement most succinctly in his Nobel Prize accept-
ance speech of 10 December 1957. While not without its problems − the statement that 
the writer ‘cannot put himself today in the service of those who make history; he is at the 
service of those who suffer it’ (Camus, 2000 [1957]: 92) posited history as an anonymous 
force to be resisted, an odd suggestion, given Camus’s previous criticism of Sartre for a 
similar portrayal of history as an irrepressible force − the speech, together with other 
texts from the second half of the 1950s, reveals that Camus’s vision of literature was not 
naïvely romantic. The argument that the role of the writer was to be in touch with the era 
while at the same time keeping ‘a certain distance from our history’ (Camus, 1995c 
[1957]: 238) was, indeed, rather vague, but it put forward a very self-reflexive notion of 
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literary practice. This notion was not disengaged, because it was attentive to the implica-
tions of the representational models it conceptualized and used. ‘Writing, by its very 
nature as a representational practice enmeshed in other discursive forms, was inescapa-
bly woven into its historical moment and participated in its violences’, Debarati Sanyal 
points out in this connection, and continues with this description of Camus’s redefinition 
of engagement:
If committed literature was to bear witness to those who suffer and are betrayed by the violence 
of esthetic and historical processes, this could only occur by somehow turning the act of writing 
against itself and by gesturing toward what, in the world of living, suffering, and embodied 
beings, was irreducible to and resisted the powers of representation. (Sanyal, 2000: 44)
Camus offered literary exemplars of what he considered engaged writing in his novella 
The Fall (1956), the collection of short stories Exile and the Kingdom (1957), and the 
unfinished, posthumously published novel The First Man (1960). These fictional reac-
tions to Sartre presented a critique of direct literary representation and the self-involved 
discourse of action in favour of dialogue, empty memory and shifts in characters’ per-
spectives. Looking for a principle that would neutralize violence − both the violence of 
self-assured action and the violence of direct, and hence one-sided, literary representa-
tion − in these stories Camus, as I have shown elsewhere (Just, 2010a; 2010b), offered 
an argument for a political appropriation of the behavioural principle of shame, because 
shame, according to him, could deactivate violence and secure a provisional sense of 
commonality among war-stricken peoples. As an alternative to guilt, which Camus saw 
as a mechanism that perpetuated the violent logic of self-involvement, the inter-subjec-
tive principle of shame was inseparable from dialogue. Shame made the acting self into 
a being for others and thereby acknowledged the singularity of each perspective while at 
the same time avoiding the dialectic that confined these perspectives into contesting 
opposites. Implying not a preoccupation with oneself but a concern for others, shame in 
Camus’s narratives made each individual act in a way that avoided both experiencing 
shame and shaming others, as shame in these stories was experienced as shameful both 
by those who were subject to a shaming gaze and by those who witnessed the shame felt 
by others. Designed to oppose monologues − in ‘The artist and his time’ (1957) Camus 
stipulated that ‘art cannot be a monologue’ (1995d [1957]: 257) − shame in Camus’s 
stories was about dialogue, uncertainty, and different perspectives, rather than about 
resolute action and unequivocal literary representation.
While many of the concerns regarding literature and politics addressed by Camus ran 
parallel to those expressed by Maurice Blanchot, their involvement in the debates over 
engagement is a story of a missed encounter: as Camus withdrew from them in early 1958, 
frustrated by their politics, which he believed only exacerbated the conflict, Blanchot 
entered them. Blanchot became involved in the political debates on Algeria in October 
1958 when, prompted by Charles de Gaulle’s assumption of power in May, seen by many 
as a coup d’état, he broke his long silence and wrote a one-page pamphlet for the second 
issue of the anti-Gaullist journal Le 14 Juillet, opening it with a declaration of refusal: 
‘At a certain moment, in the face of public events, we know that we must refuse. The 
refusal is absolute, categorical’ (Blanchot, 1997a [1958]: 111). Initiating a collaboration 
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with the journal’s editor, Dionys Mascolo, this tract was the first step that in September 
1960 eventually led Blanchot to organize, together with Mascolo and Jean Schuster, the 
‘Declaration of the Right of Insubordination in the Algerian War’ − the legendary ‘Manifesto 
of the 121’ − in which the signatories openly challenged the government and supported the 
right of French soldiers in Algeria to disobey. Although Paul Ricœur had already offered a 
milder version of this argument (Ricœur, 1957) − providing a prequel to ‘For a Negotiated 
Peace in Algeria’, a moderate counterpart to the manifesto, in which Ricœur participated 
together with, among others, Roland Barthes, Jean-Marie Domenach, Maurice Merleau-
Ponty and Jacques Le Goff, endorsing peace and negotiation, but not open rebellion, while 
at the same time pledging to follow the manifesto’s signatories to prison should they be 
arrested for their political views − the manifesto was by far the most powerful act of politi-
cal revolt to date. Not only did it set in motion impassioned political debates and mobilized 
many people against the war, it also incited governmental retribution, leading to arrests, 
trials and the blacklisting of the signatories, many of them artists, writers and filmmakers 
who were now denied public grants and state support.
Following the declaration, Blanchot returned to the role of literature and the link 
between political and literary types of engagement. In a December 1960 letter to Sartre 
praising his intention to adapt Les Temps modernes to the changing political environment 
and to include more articles on literature, Blanchot emphasized the connection between 
the two engagements, stressing the importance of making ‘the new relations of political 
and literary responsibility more perceptible, as the declaration showed they are’ 
(Blanchot, 2000a [1960]: 37). In one of the documents that Blanchot prepared in the 
wake of the declaration, as part of a project for an international journal, he talked about 
the commitment that asks the writer to be engaged ‘as a writer and from his own perspec-
tive, with the responsibility that comes to him from his writer’s truth alone’ (2000b 
[1960−2]: 60), a commitment that Blanchot posited, somewhat differently from the letter 
to Sartre, as Christopher Fynsk notes (2007: 105−8), as divergent from Sartre’s post-war 
idea of commitment. Literature was essential to politics and to ‘a certain just demand, 
perhaps a demand for justice’, according to Blanchot, because of ‘its unique relation to 
language’ and its indeterminateness (2000b: 57).
Devised as a response to Sartre’s notion of committed literature and its emphasis on 
action, strong individuality and the instrumental use of language, Blanchot’s postulation 
of literature is, like Camus’s literary use of the principle of shame and narrative resist-
ance to representation, a way of not establishing an identity. A product of language that 
in The Space of Literature (1955) Blanchot describes as one that ‘does not speak any 
more, but is’ (1982 [1955]: 27), literature is a site of resistance to action and identity 
because it questions, as Blanchot suggests in ‘Idle speech’ (1963), the heroism and 
authenticity of ‘the resolute “I”, laconic and heroic’ (1997b [1963]: 125). The role of 
literature is to suspend action and the identity of the heroic self and to create a literature 
of slowness and weakness as an alternative to the drive for mastery of the resolute self 
(see Just, 2008). If the declaration drew attention to the fact that alongside the actual war 
there was also a war of writing, it also made it clear, as Leslie Hill has pointed out, that 
the political significance of the kind of writing to which Blanchot appeals lies, again 
similarly to Camus, in the refusal of a certain type of language, a language that Hill calls 
‘authoritarian, self-assured, peremptory, repetitive, oppressive’ (Hill, 1997: 215).
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Despite the fact that Blanchot and Camus were not personally very close − or even 
intellectually close, although Blanchot devoted several essays to Camus’s work, most 
importantly, during the Algerian war, a review of the novella The Fall in 1956, and in 
1960 a reassessment of Camus’s oeuvre after the writer’s sudden death earlier that year 
− what bound them together was their anti-Sartrean position of writers who wanted to be 
politically engaged while at the same time remaining writers. They were not unsympa-
thetic to the questions raised by Sartre. They were not against political action and nor did 
they think that literature could be a substitute for action. What they nevertheless found 
objectionable was the pragmatic evaluation and functional comparison of literature and 
politics. To be sure, at times of great emergency literature interrupts itself in favour of 
action. But this interruption, Blanchot and Camus avow, cannot be posited as literature’s 
duty. Although there are moments in history that are more acute than others, and that is 
when literature interrupts itself, there is never a time of absolute tranquillity and incon-
sequentiality of action when all is resolved and when one can finally turn to literature. 
Since there is always a need for change, and thus for action rather than literature, the 
functional assessment of the two is predicated on the false assumption that literature and 
political action pursue the same goal with identical means. Unsettling the dichotomy 
between literary intransitivity and direct political engagement, Blanchot and Camus not 
only do not conflate the two in an attempt to encode the latter into the message commu-
nicated in the language of the former, they also do not separate political causes and liter-
ary practices, as the political in their conception of engagement is not consigned to a 
defence of particular policies and systems of administration. For Blanchot and Camus, 
the dilemma of literature and engagement is predicated on a much less impassable and 
vexing premise than for Sartre: they do not consider commitment, as Sartre understood 
it, to be a literary category.
According to Blanchot and Camus, the dichotomy between political commitment and 
‘art for art’s sake’ is false because, unlike politics, literature does not aim at immediate 
action. Literature pursues politics on its own terms, as a politics carried by literature. The 
writer’s role is not to decide whether writing is action, to choose between literature and 
action, and to feel either guilty or self-righteous about this choice. Blanchot and Camus 
suggest that one does not have to be a Sartrean writer to be political. One simply has to 
be a writer, as Kevin Hart phrased it in reference to Blanchot, ‘who is aware of being in 
relation with others and therefore of being responsible for what happens to them’ (Hart, 
2000: xx). Like Francis Ponge, who in 1956 declared that his political partisanship and 
work as a poet were one and the same vocation, while at the same time being adamant 
about keeping his allegiance to the Communist Party and dedication to poetry separate 
(Ponge, 1956: 276), and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who a year earlier, in an allusion to 
Sartre, argued that ‘to recognize literature and politics as distinct activities is perhaps 
finally the only way to be as faithful to action as to literature’ (1973 [1955]: 201), 
Blanchot and Camus posit a fundamental difference between political and literary 
responsibility. They insist that political action and literature cannot be substituted one for 
another, nor can the principles governing one form of engagement be implemented by 
the other, because the role of the writer is not to express concrete political goals.
The main conviction behind Blanchot’s and Camus’s contribution to the issue of liter-
ary commitment is that true change, the aim of all engagement, cannot rely solely on 
Just 237
politics. One needs to get involved in political activities, but while keeping to them, a 
more fundamental, even if less conspicuous, change has to take place, because without it 
all politics would fall to barren ground. Blanchot and Camus propose that literature is 
central to this change. Insisting that literature cannot be measured by the same criteria as 
politics, they maintain that literature is not subordinate to political action, because litera-
ture and politics are driven by demands that emerge in particular domains of each ven-
ture. Since the writer’s responsibility is determined by the truth specific to the writer, 
literature is not a matter of activist political engagement and the constitution of political 
subjects, but rather one of opening new social possibilities via literature. With instru-
ments other than politics, literature follows its own path to social transformation. Even 
though writing always functions within larger historical and social contexts, its purpose 
is to interrupt normative forms of literary representation and social being and to be open 
to the possibility of a radically different set of perceptual forms. In Blanchot’s and 
Camus’s scenario, from the point of view of concrete politics, literature has to remain 
ambiguous and cultivate what Jacques Rancière has more recently called ‘the perceptual 
disturbance of interruption’ (Rancière, 2006: 63). What Blanchot and Camus advocate is 
a notion of literature that capitalizes on this specifically political nature of literature and 
remains in a state that repels any new hierarchies. For them the concreteness of meaning 
in which Sartre saw the strength of narrative literature and its obligation to be engaged is 
a symbol of clinging to the position of strength and action that was revealed by the events 
in Algeria as problematic.
Blanchot’s and Camus’s redefinition of literary engagement does not merely suggest 
that there is time for literature and time for action, and that one needs to find a balance 
between the two, or to know when one takes precedence over the other. Their literary 
engagements are not bereft of political considerations. In this respect their position is less 
extreme than that of Georges Bataille, who proclaimed that literature is in fact guilty, not 
only when measured against political, ethical and social concerns, but essentially and 
inevitably (Bataille, 1993 [1957]: x). For Bataille, the purpose of literature − as well as 
any other fundamental and not merely utilitarian human activity, such as eroticism, ritual 
and sacrifice − is to resist practicality and preserve the distance from anything that would 
transform it into utility. If Blanchot’s and Camus’s position complies with neither the 
rhetoric of duty nor the paradigm of guilt, this is because for them the choice is not 
between responsible politics and guilty literature. The issue of literature and politics is 
not in choosing between either retreating from politics altogether or dedicating all of 
one’s energy to politics. Beyond either only utility or only a resistance to utility, theirs is 
a conception of literature that is engaged, but that practises politics as literature.
When Pavel Zemánek, a character from Milan Kundera’s first novel, The Joke (1967), 
insists that to turn away from politics is not an apolitical gesture, he talks about how 
young people do not want to sit at endless political meetings, hoping to change the world 
through engaged action and political debate. They want to travel and do things, and that, 
he concludes, is how they will actually change the world. Blanchot and Camus would 
agree that political action alone does not shape the world. The way people think and feel 
plays an equally important role, and literature is instructive in steering the course of these 
experiences. But, unlike Pavel, their position does not endorse a shift from politics to 
private life and personal interests. Pavel is an opportunist who goes with the flow of 
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historical changes, successful both now, at the time of political reforms in Czechoslovakia 
in the 1960s, and a decade earlier during Stalinist repressions. When Pavel lectures his 
former university friend Ludvík about young people and changing the world, he displays 
the same enthusiasm as in the early 1950s when he supported political purges, of which 
Ludvík was, ironically, a victim. Whereas Pavel celebrates action − political action in the 
past and private activities in the present − and encourages a shift from the public to the 
private, Blanchot and Camus are sceptical about both the privileging of activity and 
action, and the privatization of life that Henri Lefebvre described as a major systemic 
shift in post-war France (Lefebvre, 2008 [1961]: 88−95). Blanchot’s and Camus’s stance 
on engagement during the Algerian war is curiously dual: an active involvement in 
urgent political issues while fostering the principles of literary engagement that under-
mine action. If the common goal of active politics and inactive literature is to alter the 
established political models and dominant cognitive patterns and, to repeat Blanchot’s 
statement from the years following the declaration, to pursue ‘a certain just demand, 
perhaps a demand for justice’ (Blanchot, 2000b: 57), literature’s role in this task is to 
withdraw from action and representation because only this withdrawal holds the poten-
tial for a radical transformation of what could be thought, perceived and imagined.
The literary politics proposed by Blanchot and Camus challenges a propositional dis-
course of representation in order to suspend the violence intrinsic in the struggle for rec-
ognition that Sartre’s emphasis on action reinforces. If Blanchot and Camus take anything 
from Mallarmé, it is the recognition that language cannot offer a stable, final and complete 
picture − something that, paradoxically, as Denis Hollier has noted, is confirmed by 
Sartre’s own tempo of writing, which in order to stay connected with reality tries to take 
hold of the entirety of experience in a frantic attempt to record everything, thereby getting 
locked into a perpetual commentary in which words take the place of the present and 
reporting becomes the event itself (Hollier 1986 [1982]: 83). Blanchot and Camus deem 
the propositional discourse of representation politically questionable because it augments 
the impulse to judge events depicted in literary narratives. This impulse, which, as Hayden 
White has demonstrated, is inherent to narrativity and its drive to closure and an ordered 
plot, feeds our tendency ‘to moralize reality and identify it with the social system that is 
the source of any morality that we can imagine’ (White, 1980: 18).
In his Nobel acceptance speech in December 1957 Camus underscores that writers are 
‘obliged to understand rather than to judge’ (Camus, 2000 [1957]: 92). Blanchot echoes 
this statement four months later when, criticizing writers who are ‘informed about eve-
rything and judging everything immediately’, he postulates a ‘new situation in which the 
writer’ sees himself as ‘reduced to powerlessness and simplicity’. ‘When the writer today 
becomes involved in politics’, Blanchot explains, ‘he is not yet involved with politics but 
only with this new, difficult-to-see relationship that literature and language want to 
awaken in contact with public presence’ (Blanchot, 2003 [1958]: 248). If the aim of liter-
ary engagement is to minimize the impulse to judge and moralize, then the call to down-
play verisimilitude, strong characters, straightforward plot and the narrative drive to 
closure is committed because it is directed against the nation-cementing role played by 
the traditional type of storytelling and the Sartrean conception of engagement in positing 
the audience as a group united by a common perspective on the true nature of events 
featured in literary narratives.
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Blanchot’s and Camus’s problem with Sartre’s notion of commitment was in its 
political and ethical implications. They regarded Sartre’s notion as a manifestation of the 
deep-seated trend in Western modernity − of which Algeria was a grave victim − of an 
ever more vigorous social and cultural validation of an autonomous, active and strong 
self. This validation encouraged a dialectic of action that was violent because it closed in 
on itself, blind to what fell outside its field of vision. In their rethinking of engagement, 
Blanchot and Camus not only claimed that literary words were not swords, they demanded 
that words be disarmed and weakened because only the suspension of action and denota-
tion could undermine the violence of the self-assured asserting that nurtures egocen-
trism, on an individual level, and nationalism and ethnocentrism, on a collective level. 
Their conception of engagement was not a symptom of the retreat from history, or a 
defence of a-historicism and a-political formalism. It implied neither political conserva-
tism nor a compliance with the ideology of timelessness that dominated mainstream 
French culture and supported the status quo by extending de-politicization and social 
fragmentation. Directed against denotation and strong characters as agents of action, 
Blanchot’s and Camus’s literary politics espoused literature that was political precisely 
by being slow and uneventful, with weak plots and characters that did not stand out as 
sharply delineated individualities. Similarly to Theodor Adorno, who in his own take on 
commitment and critique of Sartre defended literature that educated the audience ‘to a 
new attitude, that would be distanced, thoughtful, experimental, the reverse of illusory 
empathy and identification’ (Adorno 1974 [1962]: 80), Blanchot’s and Camus’s engaged 
literature was not concerned with searching for political alternatives and producing 
coherent effects that would facilitate such a search. It was concerned rather with deacti-
vating the internal dialectic of literary characters’ projections and their interpersonal 
struggle for recognition.
The worry that Blanchot and Camus express regarding the notion of the self based on 
strength, self-assurance and an overtly active relation to the outside is that it makes eve-
rything outside the self into an image of the self, and thus instead of connectedness 
encourages self-enclosure − which, as Leo Bersani has recently argued, is flawed because 
it leads neither to self-possession nor to a possession of the outside, but to a loss of both 
the self and others (Bersani, 2008: 121; 2006: 171). Questioning the social and cultural 
dominance of this notion and its ethical and political implications, Blanchot and Camus 
propose a conception of engagement that circumvents the negative repercussions of 
strong individuality and determined action, and presents a literary figuration of a deper-
sonalized self that relates to the outside more openly and less aggressively. Envisioning 
a different relational regime, which would not perpetuate self-involved action and the 
struggle for recognition, Blanchot and Camus posit the role of the writer as symbolically 
representing an increased connectedness to the world and to others. This conception is 
engaged because, contrary to a fatalistic capitulation in the face of the presumably 
unstoppable force of history toward individualism and self-assured judgements, the 
image it promotes of a de-interiorized personhood was formulated during the Algerian 
war as a reaction against the present situation and the political ideals that led to it.
Blanchot’s and Camus’s notion of engagement makes the two diverging practices 
of coming to terms with the indeterminateness of literary language, Sartrean and 
Mallarméan, lose their incompatibility. Paradoxically an heir to both Sartre and Mallarmé, 
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this notion borrows from Sartre the conviction that literature and politics are not isolated 
endeavours, and from Mallarmé the goal, with a substantially modified strategy of 
achieving it, of weakening signification. Trying to evade the vehement struggle with 
referentiality and the resulting dialectical return of either meaning or its volatility, this 
notion is not based on the premise that literary language is political because language and 
literature always take place in concrete social milieux and that their relation to it, or a 
refusal to assume one, inevitably generates political effects. What is more important is 
the problematic nature of the prevailing understanding of the relationship between liter-
ary language and politics introduced by Sartre. Blanchot and Camus share the conviction 
that language that serves as the foundation of political society – that is, conceptual lan-
guage – is based on the myth of fixedness and semantic stability. It is this myth that sup-
ports what in the wake of the war in Algeria Blanchot and Camus addressed as a politically 
insular logic of the valorization of action and the strong self. Since the language that 
founds political society is not stable, because like all language it oscillates between the 
referential and the figural semantic fields, language is political precisely to the extent of 
being unstable. Literature, according to Blanchot and Camus, is where this instability is 
revealed, because literature is where the tension between the two semantic fields of lan-
guage comes out into the open. Exercising the workings and indeterminateness of 
language in a rhetorically self-conscious fashion, literature is aware of its fictionality and 
dependence on figural language and, as Paul de Man has remarked, is therefore ‘con-
demned to being the truly political mode of discourse’ (De Man, 1979: 157).
Notes
1. It should be pointed out that Judt has a certain proclivity for what he presents as Aron’s dispassionate 
analytical objectivity (Judt, 1998: 17). The journal Preuves with which Aron was associated, and 
which elsewhere Judt calls ‘the only liberal, anti-Communist forum’ in France whose ‘contributors 
were among the best writers of the post-war decades’ (Judt, 2006: 223), was far from impartial and 
independent, having been financed by and being under the influence of the CIA, as Peter Coleman 
and Frances Saunders have shown (Coleman, 1989: 53−5; Saunders, 1999: 213−19).
2. According to Paul Clay Sorum, the concern that if France lost its colonies they would be taken 
either by the Americans or the Soviets played an important role as well (Sorum, 1977: 79).
3. As Todd Shepard has demonstrated, the end of the war did not alter this trend. According to 
Shepard, the fact that in the late stages of the Algerian war French bureaucrats, politicians and 
journalists suddenly started presenting the move toward independence as an inevitable outcome 
of history was part of this trend. Detailing the political motives and consequences of this ‘inven-
tion of decolonization’ − the abrupt severing of links with Algeria once independence was granted 
and the effect of this break on issues such as citizenship − Shepard shows how this practice effec-
tively rewrote the history of imperialism and anti-imperialism ‘so that decolonization was the 
predetermined end point’ and so it was consistent with a ‘narrative of progress’ and the values of 
liberty, equality and fraternity introduced by the French Revolution (Shepard, 2006: 4, 6).
4. Although it should be noted, as Suzanne Guerlac has pointed out, that after being dismissed in 
the 1950s by the militant Sartre, the social and political relevance of literature was revived at 
the start of the following decade by Sartre’s analysis of praxis in the second part of his Critique 
of Dialectical Reason (Guerlac, 1993: 822).
5. Nonetheless, at the time Aron still believed in French Algeria − as his October 1955 article in 
Le Figaro demonstrates − before changing his stance in The Algerian Tragedy in 1957 and urg-
ing independence for Algeria (albeit primarily for economic reasons).
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6. The incident has been widely commented upon. It happened in Stockholm on 12 December 
1957, two days after Camus received the Nobel Prize − not, as some have claimed, in Uppsala, 
where before delivering his lecture, ‘The Artist and His Time’, Camus’s talk with local students 
contained no political questions − when what was supposed to be a discussion with students 
about literature quickly turned into a heated argument over Algeria. A text of the exchange 
was published in Le Monde on 14 December and approved by Camus, with minor adjustments 
concerning a statement about freedom of the French press in a 17 December letter to Le Monde 
(See Lottman, 1980: 618−19, 725 n. 27).
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